Temporary Takings and the Lucas Per Se Rule in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v Tahoe Regional Planning Authority by Schmitz, Angela
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-1\ORE106.txt unknown Seq: 1 11-NOV-03 9:44
Note
Angela Schmitz*
Taking Shape:  Temporary Takings
and the Lucas  Per Se Rule in
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Authority
“A limit in time, to tide over a passing trouble, well may jus-
tify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent change.”1
Since Justice Holmes invented the concept of “regulatory tak-
ings” eighty years ago,2 courts have struggled to find the dividing
line between government actions that intrude “too far” on pri-
vate property rights and so require compensation, and those that
are benign or important enough to escape liability.3  Lingering in
the background is the concern that, if too many actions fall on
the “takings” side, “government hardly could go on.”4  Line-
drawing efforts have long been informed by the underlying ten-
sion between the public interest in orderly regulation and the pri-
vate property owner’s interest in unfettered use of her land.  That
tension is the basis for the Supreme Court’s balancing test in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York .5  In its sim-
plest terms, Penn Central  says:  If the public interest outweighs
* J.D., University of Oregon School of Law, 2003.  Associate Editor, Oregon Law
Review, 2002-03.
1 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 157 (1921).
2 ROBERT MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE 5 (1999).
3 See  Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
4 Id.
5 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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the private, no taking is found; if the private outweighs the pub-
lic, courts should find a taking.6
Balancing tests are, however, maddeningly complicated.  They
require extensive factual analysis; precedents are difficult to anal-
ogize and distinguish; and outcomes are unpredictable.7  Dissatis-
fied with the complexities and uncertainties of the Penn Central
balancing test, the current Court has taken an interest in defining
categories of “per se” takings, or government actions that are
takings regardless of the public interest involved.8  In effect, per
se takings are pre-balanced.  They are categories of government
action so extreme and intrusive that they always outweigh the
public interest.9  In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council , the
Court identified a new group of per se takings as those “rare”
regulations that deny a landowner “all  economically beneficial or
productive use of land.”10
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency  [hereinafter TRPA ],11 the Court considered an-
other possible per se category. TRPA  concerns temporary devel-
opment moratoria,12 including regulations that prohibit certain
uses of land for a defined period of time.13  Scholars have long
viewed property as a “bundle of sticks,” a combination of dis-
crete property rights that owners can separate and sell.14  Prop-
erty can be splintered into spatial, functional, and temporal
dimensions:15  An owner can sell a portion of a larger parcel;
6 Id.  at 123-31.
7 See  Nathaniel S. Lawrence, Regulatory Takings:  Beyond the Balancing Test , in
REGULATORY TAKING:  THE LIMITS OF LAND USE CONTROLS 191 (G. Richard Hill
ed., 1990).
8 See id. See also MELTZ ET AL., supra  note 2, at 9.
9 Another way to phrase this is that the “categorical [per se] taking test is a special
category of the general balancing test.”  Stuart Miller, Triple Ways to Take:  The
Evolution and Meaning of the Supreme Court’s Three Regulatory Taking Standards ,
71 TEMP. L. REV. 243, 279 (1998).
10 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (emphasis added).
11 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d , 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
12 Id.  at 766.
13 See  Robert H. Freilich, Interim Development Controls:  Essential Tools for Im-
plementing Flexible Planning and Zoning , 49 J. URB. L. 65, 66 (1971).
14 Courtney C. Tedrowe, Note, Conceptual Severance and Takings in the Federal
Circuit , 85 CORNELL L. REV. 586, 586 (2000).
15 Tedra Fox, Lake Tahoe’s Temporary Development Moratorium:  Why a Stitch in
Time Should Not Define the Property Interest in a Takings Claim , 28 ECOLOGY L.Q.
399, 401 (2001).  See also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los  Angeles [hereinafter First English], for a slightly different
formulation:
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grant an easement for limited use; or lease land for a limited pe-
riod of time.  In Lucas , the Court found that regulations that
deny “all economically beneficial or productive use of land” are
automatic per se takings.16  But what does the Court in Lucas
mean by “all”?  If concerned with regulations that prohibit use of
“all” property, then what is the “property” at issue?17  Some
courts embrace “conceptual severance”—the idea that each dis-
crete strand of property should be considered its own whole.18
For example, a regulation that prohibits use of one-tenth of a
parcel is treated as a “total” prohibition for that discrete part.
Similarly, a law that forbids use of land for one month is ana-
lyzed as a limit on “all” use for that month.  With conceptual
severance, “partial” prohibitions on use of a whole fee simple
parcel become “total” prohibitions on use of the discrete
strand—“some” becomes “all.” TRPA  forced the Court to con-
front conceptual severance in the temporal dimension.  The
stakes were high:  If the Court allowed severance in the temporal
dimension, it could open the door to severance in the “space”
and “use” dimensions as well.
In the end, in a 6-3 decision, the Court soundly rejected exten-
sion of Lucas’s per se rule to temporary land use restrictions.19
In so ruling, the Court clarified and reinforced the modern shape
of takings jurisprudence.  Fault lines between physical and regu-
latory takings, and between partial and total takings, were recog-
nized and widened; conceptual severance was strongly
criticized.20
In TRPA , the Court confronted two major issues:  defining the
Regulations are three dimensional; they have depth, width, and length.  As
for depth, regulations define the extent to which the owner may not use the
property in question.  With respect to width, regulations define the amount
of property encompassed by the restrictions.  Finally, . . . regulations set
forth the duration of the restrictions.
482 U.S. 304, 330 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
17 Lucas  itself dodged the “denominator” issue:  “Regrettably, the rhetorical
force of our ‘deprivation of all economically feasible use’ rule is greater than its
precision, since the rule does not make clear the ‘property interest’ against which the
loss of value is to be measured.” Id.  at 1016 n.7.
18 The term “conceptual severance” was invented and discussed by Margaret Jane
Radin in her article, The Liberal Conception of Property:  Cross Currents in the Ju-
risprudence of Takings , 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1676 (1988).  Many commentators
refer to the same concept as “the denominator problem” or “the relevant parcel
issue.” See , e.g ., MELTZ ET AL., supra  note 2, at 144-54.
19 TRPA , 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
20 Id.  at 331.
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contours of “temporary takings” as a species of land use restric-
tion, and determining which takings test applies to temporary
land use restrictions.  This Note traces the Court’s pre-TRPA  ju-
risprudence on “temporary takings” in Section 1; reviews the
lower court decisions in the TRPA  case in Section 2; provides an
analysis of the TRPA  fact pattern according to the Court’s prece-
dents in Section 3; and, finally, reviews how the Court’s TRPA
decision comports with that precedent in Section 4.
I
LEGAL BACKDROP
A. Overview of Takings Tests
While observers describe the past two decades of Supreme
Court takings jurisprudence as “open-ended and standardless,”21
a “doctrinal and conceptual disarray,”22 and an area of “great
uncertainty,”23 some broad outlines of a legal framework are dis-
cernible, particularly since the Supreme Court’s decision in Lu-
cas . Physical  invasions of property by government have long
been considered “per se” or “categorical” takings, i.e., automatic
takings regardless of the public purpose involved.24 Regulatory
restrictions on property use, on the other hand, were not consid-
ered unconstitutional until Justice Holmes’s famous pronounce-
ment in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon  that “while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking.”25  The difficulty of defining how
far is too far has haunted the Court’s regulatory takings cases
ever since.  The most influential attempt at a resolution of the
question has been Justice Brennan’s opinion in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City .26  The Penn Central  Court
announced a balancing test for regulatory takings that considers
“[t]he economic impact of the regulation[,] . . . the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations[,] . . . [and] the character of the government
21 First English , 482 U.S. 304, 341 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22 Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause:  In Search of Underlying Principles
Part I—A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine , 77 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1304
(1989).
23 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 866 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
24 MELTZ ET AL., supra  note 2, at 117.
25 260 U.S. at 415.
26 MELTZ ET AL., supra  note 2, at 130.
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action.”27  In broad terms, the test is an “essentially ad hoc, fac-
tual inquir[y],”28 which balances public against private interests,
and finds a taking where the private harm outweighs the public
benefit.
Lucas  recognizes the existence of these separate tests—a per
se test for physical invasions and a balancing test for regulatory
actions29—and also carves out a per se category for regulatory
actions that “den[y] [the landowner] all  economically beneficial
or productive use of land.”30  Thus, while the previous dividing
line in takings analysis was between physical and regulatory tak-
ings, Lucas  points to a new dividing line within the universe of
regulatory takings namely between total and partial takings.
Now total  regulatory takings are subject to the per se test, and all
other regulatory actions fall to balancing.  Because the two tests
pose such different hurdles for takings plaintiffs, the determina-
tion of which side of the line a government action falls on is often
outcome-determinative.31
B. Temporary Development Moratoria
Temporary development moratoria, sometimes called interim
development controls, are planning “time-outs” that freeze de-
velopment, to varying degrees, while planners develop a compre-
hensive approach to a land-use problem.32  Moratoria have three
main aims:  to freeze the status quo so that the problem at issue is
not exacerbated during the planning period;33 to prevent land-
owners from rushing to begin projects that they anticipate will be
limited by new regulations;34 and, to allow a legislative approach
27 438 U.S. at 124.
28 Id.
29 505 U.S. at 1015.
30 Id.  (emphasis added).  Whether the per se category for regulatory actions that
deny all use is newly announced in Lucas  or is a restatement of past precedent is
hotly debated in the case. See id.  at 1016 n.6.
Lucas  includes an important exception to the per se rule for constraints that “in-
here in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law
of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.” Id.  at 1029.
31 See TRPA , 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1240 (D. Nev. 1999) (“The question which
remains to be answered—and which was hotly debated at trial—is whether the de-
nial was total, or only partial.  This question is important because the answer effec-
tively decides the outcome of the case.”).
32 Freilich, supra  note 13, at 66.
33 Id . at 77.
34 Id.  “Such a race-to-development would permit property owners to evade the
land-use plan and undermine its goals.” TRPA , 216 F.3d 764, 777 (9th Cir. 2000).
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to planning where the public as a whole can weigh in on a com-
mon problem.35
While moratoria are generally accepted as planning tools,36
they do have their detractors.  A common criticism is that if plan-
ners simply focused proper attention on long-term planning ef-
forts, the disruptive solution of a moratorium would be
unnecessary.37  Planners often reply that time-outs are needed if
careful planning efforts are to keep pace with explosive growth.38
In addition, planners often must respond to unforeseeable devel-
opment patterns or previously unknown environmental
impacts.39
Until the Supreme Court decided First English Evangelical Lu-
theran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles , courts typi-
cally found moratoria constitutional under the Takings Clause.40
First English , particularly when considered in combination with
the Court’s new per se rule in Lucas , muddied the waters consid-
erably.  Both commentators41 and courts42 have struggled to de-
35 Freilich, supra  note 13, at 79.
36 MELTZ ET AL., supra  note 2, at 264
37 See  Wendy U. Larsen & Marcella Larsen, Moratoria as Takings Under  Lucas,
LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., June 1994, at 3; Roger K. Lewis, Planning Is a More
Sensible Choice , URB. LAND, Sept. 1989, at 35.
38 Elizabeth A. Garvin & Martin L. Leitner, Drafting Interim Development Ordi-
nances:  Creating Time to Plan , LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., June 1996, at 3.
39 Id.
40 See  Freilich, supra  note 13, at 82; MELTZ ET AL., supra  note 2, at 273; Robert
H. Freilich & Elizabeth A. Garvin, Takings After  Lucas: Growth Management, Plan-
ning, and Regulatory Implementation Will Work Better Than Before , in AFTER LU-
CAS 63 (David L. Callies ed., 1993).  Challenged moratoria, like other partial takings,
were generally analyzed under some version of the Penn Central  balancing factors,
even if the court did not explicitly refer to Penn Central . See MELTZ ET AL., supra
note 2, at 272 (“[C]ourts will support moratoria when there is a clear public need
and the period of the moratorium is no longer than necessary.”).
41 Commentators finding takings include: DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., FED-
ERAL LAND USE LAW § 2A.05[2][c] (rev. Feb. 2002); Steven J. Eagle, Temporary
Regulatory Takings and Development Moratoria:  The Murky View from Lake
Tahoe , 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10224 (2001); Larsen & Larsen, supra  note 37, at 3.
Those reaching the opposite conclusion include: Nathaniel S. Lawrence, Regula-
tory Takings:  Beyond the Balancing Test , in REGULATORY TAKING: THE LIMITS OF
LAND USE CONTROLS 191 (G. Richard Hill ed., 1990); Thomas E. Roberts,
Moratoriums Are Alive and Well , URB. LAND, Sept. 1989, at 34; and Freilich & Gar-
vin, supra  note 40, at 63-65.
Some just note the uncertainty:  3 Patrick J. Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Con-
trols § 22.03[3] (Lori A. Hauser & Nancy H. Greening eds., 1992); Meltz et al., supra
note 2, at 279-80; Norman Williams, Jr. et al., The White River Junction Manifesto , 9
Vt. L. Rev. 193, 218 (1984) (while pre-dating the Court’s decision in First English ,
the authors speculate that if Justice Brennan’s dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric
Co. v. City of San Diego , 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981), were to become law, moratoria
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cide whether moratoria (at least those that restricted all use)
were Lucas -style categorical takings.
C. “Temporary Takings” in Supreme Court Jurisprudence
A first step in determining how to treat temporary takings
under the law is defining exactly what a “temporary taking” is.
Courts use the term interchangeably to refer to at least two dis-
tinct regulatory events.43  First, an otherwise permanent taking
could become temporary when authorities later invalidate it.
Some courts call this “retrospectively temporary.”44  Second, a
regulation could always contemplate a limited term.  This cate-
gory, which can be termed “prospectively temporary,”45 could
encompass both moratoria and permit delays.  Whether this dis-
tinction does—or should—result in different analyses for the dif-
ferent events is uncertain, but it is useful to keep the difference
in mind when examining the Court’s “temporary takings”
precedents.
The notion of a temporary physical  invasion as a taking ap-
peared in the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence as early as
1945.46  Physical takings cases award compensation for both ret-
rospectively and prospectively temporary invasions of property.47
The concept of a temporary regulatory  taking did not appear
until 1981, when Justice Brennan used the term in his dissent in
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego .48  In San
Diego Gas , the Court considered appropriate remedies for tak-
would be considered “temporary takings.”  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in First
English  validates Justice Brennan’s views on temporary takings.  482 U.S. at 314).
42 Cases finding that, under First English  and Lucas , a moratorium is a taking:
Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 133 F.3d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Corn v. City
of Lauderdale Lakes, 95 F.3d 1066, 1073 (11th Cir. 1996).
Cases reaching the opposite conclusion: TRPA , 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000);
Woodbury Place Partners v. City of Woodbury, 492 N.W.2d 258, 260-61 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992); Tocco v. New Jersey Council on Affordable Hous., 576 A.2d 328 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1990); S.E.W. Friel v. Triangle Oil Co., 543 A.2d 863, 867 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
43 TRPA , 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1249 (D. Nev. 1999)
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
47 See id.  (one-year taking of leasehold in office building); United States v. Petty
Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946) (three-year taking of leasehold in industrial facility);
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949) (one-year taking of laundry
and dry-cleaning establishment); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (tak-
ing of airspace easement by frequent overflights).
48 450 U.S. 621, 657-60 (1981).
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ings.  At the time, it was uncertain whether plaintiffs claiming
inverse condemnation could claim monetary damages, or only
equitable relief in the form of invalidation of the offending regu-
lation.49  Brennan argued in favor of monetary damages and em-
phasized that the fact that a regulation could be invalidated,
rendering the taking “temporary,” did not alter the analysis.50
Thus, Brennan’s statements in San Diego Gas  were in the con-
text of “retrospectively temporary” regulations.
In First English , the majority borrowed heavily from Bren-
nan’s San Diego Gas  dissent for its holding that damages are an
available remedy for takings claims, and that takings made tem-
porary by invalidation require damages for the period during
which the regulation is in effect.51  The plaintiff in First English
was a Lutheran Church that owned property—a retreat and
youth camp—in a flood plain on Mill Creek in the Angeles Na-
tional Forest.52  A forest fire in 1977 created a serious flood haz-
ard in the area, and a subsequent flood in 1978 caused substantial
damage to the property.53  The County of Los Angeles re-
sponded with an interim ordinance prohibiting construction of
any buildings in a designated flood protection area that included
the church’s property.54
First English  came to the Supreme Court as a narrow issue on
appeal from a California Court of Appeals decision.  The Califor-
nia trial court had struck the plaintiff’s takings claim from its
complaint.55  Citing Agins v. City of Tiburon ,56 the trial court de-
cided that the only possible remedy for regulatory takings was
declaratory relief—a declaration that the regulation was exces-
sively restrictive.57  Only if the County insisted on maintaining
the regulation in the face of this declaration was monetary relief
due.58  But if the County invalidated the ordinance, rendering the
restriction temporary, it would be saved from any monetary lia-
49 MELTZ ET AL., supra  note 2, at 476-77.
50 San Diego Gas , 450 U.S. at 657-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  For extensive criti-
cism of Brennan’s dissent in San Diego Gas , see Williams et al., supra  note 41.
51 482 U.S. at 319.
52 Id.  at 307.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.  at 309.
56 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979), aff’d on other grounds , 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
57 First English , 482 U.S. at 308-09.
58 Id.
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bility.59  Because the plaintiff in First English  sought only  mone-
tary relief, rather than declaratory relief, the trial court found its
claim invalid.60  Even if a taking had occurred, which was unde-
cided, the court felt damages were an inappropriate remedy.61
Facing this limited “compensation question,” the Supreme Court
reversed and found damages appropriate to compensate for the
period of restriction, but specifically left the question of whether
a taking occurred to the lower court on remand.62  As in the San
Diego Gas  dissent, discussion of how to handle damages for
“temporary takings” was limited to “those regulatory takings
which are ultimately invalidated by the courts,”63 i.e., retrospec-
tively temporary takings.  The Court also differentiated the cate-
gory of compensable “temporary takings” from those “normal
delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordi-
nances, variances, and the like.”64
First English  left many questions unanswered.  Did the First
English  court mean to include both retrospectively and prospec-
tively temporary restrictions on land use as “temporary takings”?
Was the Penn Central  balancing test the proper test to apply to
“temporary takings”?  And what differentiated “temporary tak-
ings” from “normal delays” in permitting?  Would development
moratoria fall into the “takings” or the “normal delays”
category?
Whether the First English  court meant to limit their holding to
retrospectively temporary takings is unclear.  While First English
did involve an “interim ordinance,” that ordinance had no clear
ending date.65  Certainly the facts before the Court were those of
a permanent restriction that could become a retrospectively tem-
porary taking, but it is possible to read its holding more broadly
to cover prospectively temporary limitations.
It is also difficult to decipher whether the First English  Court
59 Id.  at 310.
60 Id.
61 Id.  at 309.
62 Id.  at 313.  The lower court found no taking.  Following the two-part test in
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), the California Court of Appeals found
that the ordinance (1) did not deny the owner all use of the property and (2) sub-
stantially advanced the state’s interest in public safety. First English , 258 Cal. Rptr.
893, 902 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
63 First English , 482 U.S. at 310.
64 Id . at 321.
65 Id.  at 307.  The ordinance later became permanent. First English , 258 Cal.
Rptr. at 904.
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intended “temporary takings” of all use to fall under a per se
test. First English  was decided five years before Lucas ’ clear an-
nouncement of the per se rule for total regulatory takings.  On
remand, the California court appeared to use a balancing test
and considered the public purpose involved.66  This does not,
however, answer the question.  The First English  Court’s decla-
ration that “‘temporary’ takings which, as here, deny a land-
owner all use of his property, are not different in kind from
permanent takings”67 suggests that as go permanent “all use”
takings, so go temporary “all use” takings; in other words, that
Lucas  should impact both in the same way.  It is also notable that
“normal delays,” like the great majority of land use regulations,
are probably analyzed under the Penn Central  balancing test.68
Thus, it could be argued that the First English  Court had no rea-
son to differentiate “temporary takings” from “normal delays,”
unless they were treated differently under the law.
Assuming that First English’s  “temporary takings”—whatever
those may be—are subject to Lucas ’s per se test, then the more
important question for TRPA  is which camp moratoria fall
into—“temporary takings” or “normal delays in obtaining per-
mits.”  This issue is discussed further in section III.A.
While lower courts have struggled to make sense of First En-
glish ’s pronouncements on “temporary takings,”69 the Court it-
self left the issue open until deciding TRPA  in April 2002.
II
TAHOE-SIERRA PRESERVATION COUNCIL V. TAHOE
REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY
A. Facts
The conflict in TRPA  is just one skirmish in an epic battle be-
tween Lake Tahoe landowners and the Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency (TRPA),70 the unique interstate planning agency created
66 First English , 258 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
67 First English , 482 U.S. at 318.
68 See MELTZ ET AL., supra  note 2, at 139.  Partial takings encompass a broad
range of government actions including all “those situations in which government
regulation is claimed to have reduced  but not eliminated  the economic value or use
of private property.” Id.  (emphasis in original).
69 See supra  note 42.
70 In addition to this case, the TRPA  plaintiffs have made three trips to the Ninth
Circuit, not to mention innumerable forays into district courts in Nevada and Cali-
fornia.  216 F.3d at 769.  The Supreme Court previously heard one Lake Tahoe land-
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to protect the lake’s aesthetic and ecological values.  In all of
these cases, the familiar story of development versus conserva-
tion plays out overlooking a spectacular alpine lake “famed for
its scenic beauty and pristine clarity.”71  Lake Tahoe’s unusual
clarity and color results from a natural lack of nutrients that pre-
cludes algal growth.  Over the last half-century, homes, resorts,
roads, and parking lots have covered the land of the Tahoe basin,
increasing the number of impervious surfaces, and consequently
increasing the flow of nutrients into the lake.  This process of
“eutrophication” has dramatically decreased the lake’s clarity
and depleted its oxygen content; if left unchecked, it promises to
seriously harm fish populations and leave the lake “green and
opaque for eternity.”72
In an attempt to halt eutrophication, the legislatures of Cali-
fornia and Nevada, with approval from Congress, adopted the
Tahoe Regional Planning Compact and created TRPA in 1969.73
Pursuant to its mission, TRPA began identifying the classes of
land most likely to contribute to the problem.74  This process ac-
celerated when Congress amended the Compact in 1980 and gave
TRPA a strict timeline to develop “environmental threshold car-
rying capacities” (in eighteen months) and adopt a new regional
plan (twelve months after that).75  In the meantime, TRPA was
to impose temporary development restrictions on land in the ba-
sin.76  Two regulatory actions accomplished the last objective:
Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21 temporarily prohibited
most residential construction on lands classified as “high haz-
ard.”77  The temporary prohibition lasted thirty-two months and
ended when the 1984 Regional Plan was adopted.78  The new
plan had a short life—lawsuits over the plan resulted in a tempo-
rary restraining order and preliminary injunction that lasted until
owner’s challenge to TRPA’s 1987 Regional Plan in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency , 520 U.S. 725 (1997). Suitum  was limited to questions of ripeness
and the Court did not reach the substantive merits of the takings claim.
71 S. REP. NO. 91-510, at 3-4 (1969).
72 TRPA , 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1231 (D. Nev. 1999); TRPA , 216 F.3d 764, 766-67
(9th Cir. 2000).
73 TRPA , 216 F.3d at 767.
74 Id.
75 Id.  at 767-68.
76 Id.
77 TRPA , 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1233-35.
78 TRPA , 216 F.3d at 768.
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adoption of a new regional plan in 1987.79
Plaintiffs, owners of “high hazard” lands subject to building
prohibitions, sued TRPA under various theories.80  The claim at
issue in TRPA  was that the temporary restrictions imposed by
Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21 amounted to “temporary
takings” of the plaintiffs’ land.81
B. District Court Decision
Uncertain whether a temporary taking should be classified as
partial (so subject to the Penn Central  balancing test), or total (so
subject to Lucas ’s per se test), the Nevada District Court ran the
facts through both.82  The court found no “partial” taking under
Penn Central—perhaps not surprisingly because the plaintiffs
made a tactical decision not to put on evidence for a Penn Cen-
tral  theory83—but did find a “total” taking under Lucas .84
Under the Penn Central  test, the court considered the plain-
tiffs’ “reasonable, investment-backed expectations,” and found it
unreasonable for the plaintiffs to expect to build during the mor-
atorium since the average holding time before construction for
Tahoe landowners is twenty-five years.85  The court was unable
to consider economic impact due to the lack of evidence.86  Fi-
nally, the court found great merit in the “character of the govern-
ment action”—an effort to protect Lake Tahoe by limiting
development on “high hazard” lands in the basin.87
Turning to the Lucas  test, the court pondered how to deter-
mine whether the plaintiffs had been “deprived of all economi-
cally viable use of their land.”88  This led to an analysis of the
difference between “use” and “value,” and consideration of
whether Lucas  requires finding a deprivation of “all value” or
79 Id.
80 Id.  at 768-69.
81 Id.  at 766.  While some landowners eventually were allowed to build on their
lots, others were subject to permanent restrictions under subsequent plans.  Some
have since sold to private parties or government agencies.  Oral Arguments, TRPA ,
2002 WL 43288 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2002).
82 TRPA , 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1240-43.
83 Id . at 1242.
84 Id . at 1245.
85 Id . at 1240-41.
86 Id . at 1241.
87 Id . at 1241-42.
88 Id . at 1242.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-1\ORE106.txt unknown Seq: 13 11-NOV-03 9:44
Taking Shape:  Temporary Takings and the Lucas Per Se Rule 201
“all use.”89  Strangely, while the court considered value in terms
of the entire fee simple parcel (the intuitive approach), “use” was
considered only in terms of the period of the moratorium.90
While finding value relevant and acknowledging that some value
certainly remained in the properties, the court decided that the
existence of some value  did not answer Lucas ’s question.  In-
stead, reading the Lucas  language narrowly, Judge Reed decided
that “use” was the proper inquiry and found that the moratorium
deprived the owners of “all use.”91
Finally, the court considered TRPA’s “defense” that moratoria
cannot be takings.92  Recognizing that courts are split on the is-
sue of whether moratoria are included among the “temporary
takings” of First English , the court sided with the landowners.93
Moratoria, they decided, were not meant to fall under the First
English  exception for “normal delays.”94  Also, the First English
Court used prospectively temporary physical  takings as support
for the proposition that temporary takings are compensable, sug-
gesting the Supreme Court saw no difference between retrospec-
tively temporary and prospectively temporary regulations.95
C. Ninth Circuit Decision
The Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court’s decision.  While
agreeing that the moratorium did not constitute a taking under
Penn Central ,96 the Ninth Circuit took issue with the lower
court’s use of conceptual severance to find a taking of “all” use
for the period of the moratorium under the Lucas  per se test.
The court noted that the Supreme Court has rejected concep-
tual severance in all three property use dimensions:  space, func-
tion, and time.97  In the spatial dimension, the court pointed out
that both Penn Central  and Keystone Bituminous Coal Associa-
tion v. DeBenedictis  counsel against dividing the relevant prop-
erty into pieces:  “‘Taking’ jurisprudence does not divide a single
89 Id.  at 1242-43.
90 Id.
91 Id.  Confusingly, the court determined “economically viable use” by examining
whether a competitive market existed for the properties—an inquiry that seems to
refer back to an assessment of value. See id . at 1243.
92 Id . at 1248.
93 Id . at 1248-50.
94 Id . at 1250.
95 Id . at 1250.
96 TRPA , 216 F.3d 764, 782 (9th Cir. 2000).
97 Id . at 774-76.
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parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether
rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.”98
With regard to function, the court referenced Andrus v. Allard ,99
a case concerning a prohibition on the sale of eagle feathers.100
The Andrus  court found no taking because the other uses of the
property—the rights to possess, donate, and devise—were not
abrogated:  “[W]here an owner possesses a full ‘bundle’ of prop-
erty rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a
taking because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.”101
For the temporal dimension, the Ninth Circuit countered First
English  by asserting that Agins v. City of Tiburon102 already dis-
approved the notion of conceptual severance of time.103  In
Agins , the City of Tiburon began precondemnation activities on
the plaintiff’s property but later abandoned the effort.104  One of
plaintiff’s takings theories was that the condemnation effort “so
burdened [their] enjoyment of their property so as to constitute a
taking.”105  The Agins  court found that changes in value during
government decision-making are “incidents of ownership.  They
cannot be considered as a ‘taking’ in the constitutional sense.”106
Perhaps recognizing that Agins  is less than clear in its applicabil-
ity to temporary takings, the court insisted that time should be
treated no differently from the other dimensions:  “It would
make little sense to accept temporal severance and reject spatial
or functional severance.”107  The Ninth Circuit also found that
First English  did not mean to encompass moratoria, noting the
distinction between prospectively temporary and retrospectively
temporary regulations.108  The fact that the First English  court
98 Id.  at 774-75 (quoting Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
130 (1978)).
99 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
100 TRPA , 216 F.3d at 775.
101 Id.  (quoting Andrus , 444 U.S. at 65-66).
102 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
103 TRPA , 216 F.3d at 775-76.
104 Id.  at 776.
105 Id.  (quoting Agins , 447 U.S. at 263 n.9).
106 Id .  The quote in TRPA  comes from Agins , which quoted Danforth v. United
States , 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939).  In my view, Danforth  says something slightly differ-
ent:  The fact that government activities reduce land value for a period of time does
not mean that the owner can claim a “taking” of the difference between the original
value and the reduced value. See Danforth , 308 U.S. at 285.  The fact that the gov-
ernment action in Agins  appears to be retrospectively temporary, rather than pro-
spectively temporary, is also problematic.
107 TRPA , 216 F.3d at 776.
108 Id.  at 777-78.
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referred to prospectively temporary regulations was irrelevant,
according to the Ninth Circuit, because all of the cases cited in-
volved physical invasions:  “[P]hysical occupations and appropri-
ations have always received markedly different analytic
treatment than other regulatory takings.”109
The Ninth Circuit considered the district court’s use/value dis-
tinction and took a different approach.  Both use and value, the
court decided, should be viewed from the perspective of perma-
nent fee simple ownership.110  While it was clear that the morato-
rium did not take “all value,” the Ninth Circuit found it was
equally clear the regulation did not take “all use” because poten-
tial post-moratorium uses remained.111
D. Dissent to Denial of Rehearing En Banc
The TRPA  plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing en banc that
was later denied.112  However, five Ninth Circuit judges strongly
disagreed with the denial and the Ninth Circuit panel’s opin-
ion.113  The judges asserted that moratoria certainly fall within
First English ’s definition of temporary takings and not within the
case’s exception for “normal delays.”114  The judges strenuously
objected to the panel’s rejection of conceptual severance, arguing
that “temporary takings” should be treated exactly like “perma-
nent takings”—as total  deprivations for a discrete period of
time.115  They rejected any difference between physical takings
and regulatory takings that involve a “total deprivation of benefi-
cial use.”116  Finally, they revived the District Court’s distinction
between “use” and “value.”  Reading Lucas ’s holding nar-
rowly—that a taking occurs when there is a “total deprivation of
beneficial use, from the landowner’s point of view”—the dissent-
ers found that, even if value remained and use was available after
the moratorium, any prohibition on use now , during the morato-
109 Id.  at 779.
110 Id.  at 780-82.
111 Id.
112 TRPA , 228 F.3d 998, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2000).
113 Id.  at 999.
114 Id . at 1000.  In what seems contrary to the First English  court’s intent, they
even narrow the exception further by saying that such delays could be categorical
takings if they “deprive the landowner of all economically beneficial uses of the
property for their duration.” Id . at 1003.
115 Id . at 1000.
116 Id . at 999.
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rium, constituted a per se taking.117
E. A Note on Tactics
TRPA’s significance to broader takings jurisprudence is largely
a function of tactical choices the landowners made in bringing
their claim.  First, the plaintiffs brought a facial, rather than an
“as-applied,” takings claim.118  This required the Court to focus
on the regulation’s “general scope and dominant features,”
rather than its on-the-ground effects on specific property own-
ers.119  This is a more difficult endeavor, described by courts as
“an uphill battle.”120  This means that a decision for the landown-
ers in TRPA  would set a precedent that reaches far beyond the
facts at issue in the case:  All moratoria that restrict all use will
be per se takings, whether they last a year or ten minutes.121  Sec-
ond, the plaintiffs hoped to place moratoria under the Court’s
per se rule, rather than the Penn Central  balancing rule.122  The
limited scope of the issue before the Court was clear from the
Question Presented in the Court’s grant of certiorari:  “Whether
the Court of Appeals properly determined that a temporary mor-
atorium on land development does not constitute a taking of




A. Are Moratoria “Temporary Takings” Under First English?
Are moratoria more like the retrospectively temporary takings
at issue in First English , or the “normal delays in permitting”
that First English  specifically excludes?  Conceptually, it makes
sense that retrospectively temporary actions should be treated
117 Id.  at 999-1001.
118 Respondent’s Brief at *2, TRPA , 2001 WL 1480565 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2001).
119 TRPA , 216 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2000).
120 Id.  at 773-74 (quoting Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725,
736 n.10 (1997)).
121 The TRPA  plaintiffs confirmed this result in oral arguments before the Court:
“If there is a total prohibition of use . . . for 10 minutes . . . there is liability.”  Oral
Arguments at *12, TRPA , 2002 WL 43288 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2002).
122 As noted above, while the District Court considered the claim under Penn
Central , the plaintiffs put on no evidence for a Penn Central  “partial taking” claim.
TRPA , 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1241 (D. Nev. 1999)
123 TRPA , 533 U.S. 948 (2001).
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the same as permanent actions—after all, they were always in-
tended to be permanent.  If courts mean to deter government
actions that permanently restrict all use, they will not want to
give government the “out” of invalidation in case a taking is
found.  If compensation is not required for the period the regula-
tion is in effect, there are no consequences to government for
imposing an unconstitutional regulation—it may be found inva-
lid, but no damages will be due.124  In this sense, First English ’s
declaration (that “‘temporary’ takings which . . . deny a land-
owner all use of his property, are not different in kind from per-
manent takings”)125 makes sense.  Retrospectively temporary
takings are not really partial takings at all.  As the Ninth Circuit
phrased it, the taking  is what is temporary, not the regulation.126
Moratoria are different in purpose and effect.  Like permit de-
lays, moratoria contemplate some use at the end of a finite pe-
riod of government analysis.  While a moratorium may ultimately
result in limitations on land use, the overriding purpose is to re-
assess land use for the whole area for the benefit of all of its
residents.127  Such “reciprocity of advantage” (discussed further
below in section III.A.1.) has long been viewed as justification
sufficient to defeat a takings claim.128  Any given landowner may
ultimately benefit from the reasoned and deliberate planning
made possible by the moratorium; the specific restrictions that
may apply permanently to a piece of property are not known un-
til planning is complete and the moratorium ends.  If, at the end
of the moratorium, some landowners are prohibited from all use
124 See  San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26
(1981) (“Such liability might also encourage municipalities to err on the constitu-
tional side of police power regulations.”).  For criticism of this view, see Williams et
al., supra  note 41, at 223-25 (“This rationale might be persuasive if, but only if,
decisions on ‘takings’ were predictable according to rules which are clearly defined
and well-settled on a nation-wide basis.” Id . at 224.).
125 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los An-
geles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987).
126 TRPA , 216 F.3d 764, 778 (9th Cir. 2000).
127 See generally  Freilich, supra  note 13.
128 The term “average reciprocity of advantage” was first coined by Justice
Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon , 260 U.S. 393 (1922).  Justice Holmes
found that the requirement that a mining company leave pillars of coal sufficient to
provide support for the land above also served the company by protecting its work-
ers from mine collapse, and thus “secured an average reciprocity of advantage that
has been recognized as a justification of various laws.” Id . at 415.  For history and
further discussion of the concept, see Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage
and Regulatory Takings:  Toward a New Theory of Takings Jurisprudence , 40 AM. U.
L. REV. 297 (1990).
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(as some Lake Tahoe landowners were),129 nothing prevents
them from pursuing a takings claim for permanent deprivation
under Lucas .
Of course, a determination that moratoria are not First En-
glish -style “temporary takings” does not mean that moratoria
could never be takings.  As with other partial takings, the Penn
Central  test applies.130  If there are questions about “the charac-
ter of the government action”—the moratorium is longer than it
needs to be or is not the appropriate response to the problem
and the impact on the landowner is severe—then a moratorium
could be a taking.131
The fact that moratoria do look more like “normal delays in
permitting” than the retrospectively temporary takings in First
English  creates another problem.  If moratoria are held to be
First English -style “temporary takings,” the Court will have to
carefully distinguish “normal delays” to prevent dragging those
actions under a per se rule as well.  Formulating the distinction is
not simple:  The effect of both moratoria and permit delays on
the owner is the same—a total prohibition on use for a period of
government deliberation.132  While the Court could simply say
that “moratoria” are subject to the per se rule and “permit de-
lays” are not, this may have the unfortunate effect of driving
planners to simply re-characterize needed planning reviews as a
series of “permit delays.”  Such a permit-by-permit process will
have the same impact on landowners but will seriously hamper
planners’ ability to conduct thoughtful, comprehensive reviews in
a legislative process that allows broad community input.133
B. Are Moratoria Per Se Takings Under Lucas?
The determination of which government actions fall under the
129 Petitioners’ Brief at *2, TRPA , 2001 WL 1692011 (U.S. Sept. 12, 2001).
130 See MELTZ ET AL., supra  note 2, at 139.
131 See MELTZ ET AL., supra  note 2, at 272:  (“[C]ourts will support moratoria
when there is a clear public need and the period of the moratorium is no longer than
necessary.”)  For examples of courts applying Penn Central  (or some form of balanc-
ing rule) to moratoria and finding takings, see  Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Dep’t of
Transp., 563 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1990); Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Vill. of South
Nyack, 244 N.E.2d 700 (N.Y. 1969); Q.C. Constr. Co. v. Gallo, 649 F. Supp. 1331
(D.R.I. 1986).
132 The Supreme Court clearly struggled with how to express this distinction in
oral arguments on TRPA . See  Oral Arguments at *14-22, TRPA , 2002 WL 43288
(U.S. Jan. 7, 2002).
133 See id.  at *51.
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per se rule and which are subject to a balancing test has over time
been dictated by two persistent dichotomies in takings jurispru-
dence:  physical and regulatory takings; and total and partial tak-
ings.  Finding a per se taking in TRPA  would to some extent
require collapsing one or both of these dividing lines.  There are
three conceptual possibilities here: temporary regulatory takings
are not different in kind from temporary physical takings (i.e.,
regulatory restrictions are like physical restrictions); partial regu-
latory takings deserve the same treatment as total regulatory tak-
ings (i.e., partial restrictions are like total restrictions); and, a
conceptual severance, employing a variation on the second possi-
bility, where temporary takings are not partial at all—they are
total takings of the time period at issue (i.e., partial restrictions
are  total restrictions).  For the final two possibilities, it is also
necessary to consider whether the lines collapse only for restric-
tions in the “time” dimension, or if the same reasoning applies to
“space” and “function” restrictions.
It is useful to review which categories of actions are currently
subject to Penn Central ’s balancing test and which are per se tak-
ings, with an eye to the three dimensions of space, function, and
time.  As mentioned above, actions under the per se rule are in a
sense pre-balanced under Penn Central ’s factors.  Courts have
looked at the possible public purposes and the impact on the
owner and have in effect said, “In these special circumstances, we
already know that the impact on the owner far outweighs any
conceivable public purpose.  We will lay a heavy and decisive
hand on the landowner’s side of the scales.”
Per se takings include all physical invasions, whether total or
partial.134  Among the partial group, takings of limited space,
function, and time are represented.  The lead case of Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.  recognizes and empha-
sizes the principle that “even minimal physical occupations con-
stitute takings which give rise to a duty to compensate.”135  In
Loretto , the owner of a New York apartment building was
awarded compensation because a state statute allowed cable
companies to place cable boxes, each the size of a shoe box, on
the roofs of apartment buildings.136  In United States v. Causby ,
134 MELTZ ET AL., supra  note 2, at 117-18.
135 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los An-
geles, 482 U.S. 304, 329 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136 458 U.S. 419 (1982).  The language in Loretto  seems to suggest that physical
invasions must be “permanent” to be per se takings:  “[W]hen the physical intrusion
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frequent flights over a landowner’s property, interfering with the
owner’s rights to the airspace, resulted in a taking.137  In a series
of World War II cases, the Supreme Court awarded compensa-
tion to individuals whose property was taken for finite periods of
time to further the war effort.138
For regulatory restrictions, Lucas  applies the per se rule to
“the relatively rare situations where the government has de-
prived a landowner of all economically beneficial uses” of her
land.139  The Penn Central  balancing test applies to anything left
over, that is, partial regulatory limits on use of land.140  The
Court has so far resisted applying a per se test to partial takings
in the “space” and “function” dimensions; with TRPA , the Court
extended that resistance to the “time” dimension.141
1. The Regulatory/Physical Distinction
Application of a per se rule to moratoria would require a find-
ing that the traditional distinction between physical and regula-
tory takings is no longer valid.142  Indeed, this is the very
reaches the extreme form of a permanent physical occupation, a taking has oc-
curred.” Id . at 426.  The Loretto  court even finds a constitutional distinction be-
tween a permanent occupation and a temporary physical invasion, referring to
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins , 447 U.S. 74 (1980), for support. Loretto , 458
U.S. at 434.  Both Pruneyard  and National Board of YMCAs v. United States , 395
U.S. 85 (1969), seem to suggest that temporary physical invasions are not per se
takings.  But the facts of both are so unusual that their precedential value is limited:
In Pruneyard  the Court found no taking where speech rights required a mall owner
to allow leafletters on his property; in YMCA , United States soldiers occupied a
building in the Panama Canal Zone to prevent intrusion by rioters and the Court
found no taking.  At most, they represent an unresolved conflict in the Supreme
Court’s physical takings jurisprudence, which also clearly endorses compensation for
temporary physical invasions in its World War II cases, see infra  note 138, and reaf-
firms that understanding in First English . See First English , 482 U.S. at 319.  The
Federal Circuit reconciled the conflict by simply deciding that “permanent” does not
really mean permanent :  “A ‘permanent’ physical occupation does not necessarily
mean a taking unlimited in duration.”  Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d
1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
137 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
138 See  United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); United States v.
Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338
U.S. 1 (1949).
139 505 U.S. at 1018.
140 MELTZ ET AL., supra  note 2, at 139-41.
141 See TRPA , 535 U.S. at 330-31.
142 In TRPA , the Ninth Circuit panel and dissent to the motion for en banc re-
hearing clearly take opposite views on the existence of the physical/regulatory dis-
tinction.  According to the panel, “physical occupations and appropriations have
always received markedly different analytic treatment than other regulatory tak-
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observation that gave birth to Justice Holmes’ idea of “regula-
tory takings” in Pennsylvania Coal .143  In his dissent in San Diego
Gas , Justice Brennan emphasized the “essential similarity of reg-
ulatory ‘takings’ and other ‘takings.’”144  More recently, Justice
Scalia based his Lucas  holding on the observation that “total
deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner’s point of
view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation.”145
Despite this trend, the distinction between physical and regula-
tory actions persists.146  One possible explanation is the existence
of a “reciprocity of advantage” for landowners subject to regula-
tory actions.  Another is the difference in the level and character
of the intrusion.
Views of the meaning of “reciprocity of advantage” are di-
verse.147  While in Pennsylvania Coal  Justice Holmes seems to
have intended the phrase to refer to situations where the bur-
dened owner directly  benefits in some sense from the regulation
(as in the case of mine owners benefiting from a regulation that
prevents mine collapse),148 others on the Court have taken the
idea further.  In Penn Central , Justice Brennan found that New
York City’s building restrictions were not so burdensome to the
plaintiffs because they ultimately benefited all New York City re-
sidents, including the plaintiffs, “by improving the quality of life
in the city as a whole.”149 Indirect  advantage was enough.  While
ings.” TRPA , 216 F.3d at 779.  According to the dissent, “First English  rejected
[the] distinction” between physical and regulatory takings. TRPA , 228 F.3d at 1002.
143 260 U.S. at 415-16.
144 450 U.S. at 651.
145 505 U.S. at 1017.
146 See  Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (decision that the invasion was regu-
latory, not physical, is decisive in determination of no taking); Lucas , 505 U.S. at
1015 (describing the categories subject to per se analysis—physical takings and “to-
tal” regulatory takings—as “two discrete categories”); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503
U.S. 519 (1992) (decision that invasion is not physical is determinative); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 430 (1982) (“More recent
cases confirm the distinction between a permanent physical occupation, a physical
invasion short of an occupation, and a regulation that merely restricts the use of
property.”).
147 See MANDELKER ET AL., supra  note 41, at § 2A.03[3].
148 This view seems similar to Justice Rehnquist’s in his Penn Central  dissent:
“While zoning at times reduces individual  property values, the burden is shared
evenly and it is reasonable to conclude that on the whole an individual who is
harmed by one aspect of the zoning will be benefited by another.”  438 U.S. at 147
(emphasis in original). See MANDELKER ET AL., supra  note 41, at § 2A.03[3].
149 Penn Central , 438 U.S. at 134.  Justice Stevens earlier described regulatory re-
strictions as “part of the burden of common citizenship.”  Keystone Bituminous
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Justice Scalia may not share Justice Brennan’s broad view that
reciprocity is present when the landowner indirectly shares in a
benefit available to an entire community, he did recognize the
force of the “reciprocity of advantage” concept in Lucas .  In jus-
tifying per se treatment for total regulatory takings, Justice Scalia
noted:
Surely, at least, in the extraordinary circumstance when no
productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted,
it is less realistic to indulge our usual assumption that the legis-
lature is simply “adjusting the benefits and burdens of eco-
nomic life” in a manner that secures an “average reciprocity of
advantage” to everyone concerned.150
Whether courts take a broad or narrow view, they do recog-
nize that regulatory restrictions, in contrast to physical invasions,
more often benefit the landowners.  In the case of moratoria, a
“reciprocity of advantage” is present under either view:  A land-
owner who is prevented from using her land during the term of a
moratorium may ultimately both directly and indirectly benefit
from the reasoned and deliberate planning process made possible
by the moratorium.
The other major difference between physical and regulatory
government restrictions on land is the basic character of the in-
trusion.  As the Loretto  court recognized, “[t]he power to ex-
clude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured
strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights.”151  The court in
Loretto  also asserts that physical invasion is “qualitatively more
severe than a regulation of the use  of property.”152  But the phys-
ical/regulatory distinction has recently lost some of its force.  Jus-
tice Scalia asserted in Lucas  that “total deprivation of beneficial
use is, from the landowner’s point of view, the equivalent  of a
physical appropriation.”153  It must be remembered, though, that
Lucas  was decided in the context of a permanent  restriction on
use; it is not unreasonable for the landowner who is permanently
prohibited from using his land to find that situation as burden-
some as a physical invasion.  Justice Scalia’s “equivalence” argu-
ment has far less force in the context of temporary restrictions.
Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987) (quoting Kimball Laundry Co.
v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949)).
150 505 U.S. at 1017 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
151 458 U.S. at 435.
152 Id.  at 436 (emphasis in original).
153 505 U.S. at 1017 (emphasis added).
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In fact, that is because temporary limits are more likely to in-
volve very direct reciprocities of advantage.
While the physical/regulatory distinction has lost some force in
the case of total takings, the presence of significant reciprocities
of advantage for partial use restrictions justifies the continued
application of a balancing test in these situations.
2. The Partial/Total Distinction
The importance of the distinction between partial and total re-
strictions intensified with Lucas ,154 a case that placed total tak-
ings under a per se rule and left partial takings to Penn Central .
The distinction is justified by both fairness and “functional”
concerns.
The difference in severity of intrusion between a partial and
total regulatory taking is obvious.  Conceptual severance tends to
confuse this by finding total takings of partial strands.  But a look
at the “landowner’s point of view,” important in Lucas , shows
the inherent flaw with conceptual severance.  A “total taking for-
ever” is simply not the same as a “total taking for one year.”155
Treating both the same has significant consequences for the fair-
ness of takings law.  This is easily illustrated in the case of mora-
toria.  If a per se rule is applied to moratoria, the landowner
whose use was restricted during the moratorium may actually see
an increase in her property’s value as a consequence of the or-
derly planning made possible by the moratorium.156  Because the
restriction is temporary, the landowner has the opportunity to
“collect” later on the dividends of the government action.  Why
should the landowner also be allowed to collect a windfall in the
form of damages for a “temporary taking”?  This fairness prob-
lem seems especially acute for partial takings in the “time” di-
mension.  Partial takings of “space” or “function” are less likely
to have such strong “reciprocities of advantage.”
Another way of approaching the fairness issue is to examine
the factors not considered under a per se test that are captured in
154 MANDELKER ET AL., supra  note 41, at § 2A.03[5].
155 See  Woodbury Place Partners v. City of Woodbury, 492 N.W.2d 258, 261
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (“We interpret the phrase ‘all economically viable use for two
years’ as significantly different from ‘all economically viable use’ as applied in Lu-
cas . . . . [E]conomic viability exists at the moratorium’s expiration.”).
156 This scenario is not far-fetched.  Some TRPA  plaintiffs were allowed to build
on their land after the moratorium but still pursued damages for the period of the
moratorium. See  Oral Arguments at *23, TRPA , 2002 WL 43288 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2002).
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the Penn Central  analysis—in particular, the owner’s “distinct in-
vestment-backed expectations” and the “economic impact” on
the landowner.157 A landowner’s “reasonable investment-backed
expectations” probably do not include the right to build at any
time on their property, due to the extensive permitting require-
ments for construction.  The “economic impact” of the morato-
rium depends entirely on the likelihood that uses will be allowed
after the moratorium.  The fact that some Tahoe landowners did
sell their properties during the moratorium indicates that there
was some expectation in the market of post-moratorium use.158
So even ignoring the strong support for the “government action”
involved in TRPA , the other two Penn Central  factors offer a
more complete picture of the true “intrusion” imposed on the
TRPA  landowners.  Indeed, because the per se test is intended to
apply to only the most severe regulatory takings,159 any invasion
that fails to meet the Penn Central  test should logically fail the
per se test as well.160  The Penn Central  test does a much better
job of capturing the true impacts of partial regulatory
restrictions.
Some Justices recognize this inherent problem with the per se
rule.  In the recent case of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island , Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence noted the advantage of a balancing test
in allowing courts to see all of the factors relevant to a takings
case and to prevent windfalls.161  The court considered whether
there was a per se rule that a taking not  be found in cases where
the landowner purchased the property after  notice of the regula-
tory restriction (so-called “postregulation acquisition”).162  Argu-
ing against application of a per se rule “in either direction” and
in favor of considering the notice issue under the Penn Central
balancing test, Justice O’Connor stated in her concurrence that if
notice is not allowed “to inform the analysis, then some property
owners may reap windfalls and an important indicium of fairness
is lost.”163
157 See  438 U.S. at 124.
158 See TRPA , 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1242-43 (D. Nev. 1999).
159 In Lucas , Justice Scalia refers to the situations calling for per se treatment as
“extraordinary circumstances.”  505 U.S. at 1017.
160 As noted above, the trial court in TRPA  found a taking under the Lucas  per
se test but no taking under the Penn Central  balancing test. See TRPA , 34 F. Supp.
2d at 1242, 1245.
161 535 U.S. 606, 635-36 (2001).
162 Id.  at 2462.
163 Id.  at 2467.
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An additional fairness issue arises if temporary takings, as a
subgroup of partial takings, are analyzed under the per se rule,
but other partial takings are not.  As Justice Stevens pointed out
in his First English  dissent, it is patently unfair to award compen-
sation to one owner who is prohibited from “all use” of his land
for two years, but not to another owner who is permanently sub-
ject to a regulation that reduces her property’s value by eighty
percent.164
Finally, the distinction between partial and total takings has a
purely “functional” basis.  In Lucas , Justice Scalia predicted the
per se rule would only apply in “relatively rare situations.”165
Justice Scalia further noted:
[T]he functional  basis for permitting the government, by regu-
lation, to affect property values without compensation—that
“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values inci-
dent to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law”—does not apply to the
relatively rare situations where the government has deprived a
landowner of all economically beneficial uses.166
If we hope that government will not just “go on,” but will also
function in an efficient, deliberate, and productive way, we must
make way for sensible government restrictions on land, such as
moratoria.  Drawing a line between partial and total regulatory
takings, as Justice Scalia suggests, may be essential to that effort.
While the conceptual history of the partial/total distinction
suggests that moratoria should not fit under the Lucas  per se
rule, the question remains:  Does the language  of Lucas  mandate
per se treatment for moratoria?  At the heart of this question is
the use/value distinction described by all of the TRPA  courts.167
Both the district court and Ninth Circuit dissent to the motion for
en banc rehearing asserted that the phrase “economically benefi-
cial or productive use”168 requires a focus on short-term “use”
rather than on long-term “value.”169  The Ninth Circuit resolved
the problem by asserting that both “use” and “value” are prop-
erly viewed “from the present to the future.”170  Which side has
164 See  482 U.S. at 332.
165 505 U.S. at 1018.
166 Id.  (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
167 See  34 F. Supp. 2d at 1242-43; 216 F.3d at 780-82; 228 F.3d at 1001.
168 Lucas , 505 U.S. at 1015.
169 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1242-43; 228 F.3d at 1001.
170 216 F.3d at 782.
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the better grasp of Lucas ’s intended meaning is unclear.  Cer-
tainly Lucas  was decided in the context of a case where the land
had lost all of its value due to the permanent prohibition on
building.171  The district court and the dissent’s readings would
also pull under the Lucas  rule the “normal delays” in permitting
specifically exempted under First English ,172 a result the Ninth
Circuit dissent endorses.173  A long-term view of “use” would be
consistent with Justice Scalia’s insistence that the Lucas  rule only
applies in “rare” situations; application of the “all use” definition
to permitting delays means Lucas  would apply in untold num-
bers of cases.  The choice of language also makes sense in light of
the fact that regulations will rarely if ever render land totally
“valueless,” even if use is severely even totally restricted.
Whatever Justice Scalia’s intended meaning, TRPA  presented an
opportunity for the Court to resolve long-standing confusion
over Lucas ’s “use” language.174
IV
SUPREME COURT DECISION
TRPA  arose soon after the Court expressed a new antipathy
toward per se rules in the takings realm in Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island .175 Palazzolo  addressed a proposed per se rule in the
other direction—a rule that, under some circumstances, a gov-
ernment restriction could never  be a taking.176  In her concur-
rence, Justice O’Connor cautioned that “[t]he temptation to
adopt what amount to per se  rules in either direction must be
resisted.”177  This discomfort with expansion of per se categories
clearly colored the TRPA  decision.178
In TRPA , the Court tackled the issue from two angles.  First,
the Court reviewed modern takings cases (particularly Lucas  and
First English) to determine whether they already compel a per se
171 505 U.S. at 1020 (“The trial court found Lucas’s two beachfront lots to have
been rendered valueless by respondent’s enforcement of the coastal-zone construc-
tion ban.”).
172 See  482 U.S. at 321.
173 228 F.3d at 1002.
174 TRPA , 216 F.3d at 780 (“The phrase’s precise meaning is elusive, and has not
been clarified by the Supreme Court.”).
175 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
176 Id . at 626.
177 Id . at 636 (emphasis in original).
178 See  535 U.S. at 320-22, 341-42.
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rule for moratoria.179  Then the Court stepped back and took a
broader view to determine whether the Fifth Amendment’s over-
riding interest in “fairness and justice” called for a new per se
rule.180  Under both analyses, the Court rejected a categorical
rule for moratoria.
In reviewing precedent, the Court explained why First English
and Lucas  do not require a per se rule for moratoria.  The Court
began by noting the long-standing distinction between physical
and regulatory restrictions on the use of land.181  The plain lan-
guage of the Fifth Amendment itself, the Court argued, only
clearly addresses physical appropriations; the Amendment says
nothing about mere use  restrictions.182  While physical invasions
are obvious and always compensated, courts must use complex
analyses to determine whether mere use restrictions approach
the severity of physical appropriations, and so also fall under the
Takings Clause.183  For this reason, the Court argued, it is inap-
propriate to use precedent applying a per se rule to temporary
physical  appropriations to situations involving temporary regula-
tory  limits on use.184  The distinction is justified, according to the
Court, by functional concerns:  If the vast assortment of land use
regulations were treated as per se takings, this “would transform
government regulation into a luxury few governments could
afford.”185
Next, the court addressed the obvious exception to the physi-
cal/regulatory distinction, namely Lucas .  Here the Court turned
to the total/partial distinction.  Recalling Penn Central ’s admoni-
tion to focus on “the parcel as a whole,” the Court found that its
precedents clearly reject conceptual severance:  “[W]here an
owner possesses a full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction
of one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking.”186 Lucas  was dis-
tinguished as applying to a restriction that “was unconditional
and permanent,” encompassing “all  economically beneficial
uses.”187  The per se rule in Lucas  applied to the “extraordinary
179 Id.  at 320-32.
180 Id.  at 331-42.
181 Id.  at 320-22.
182 Id.
183 Id.  at 322 n.17.
184 Id.  at 322-24.
185 Id.  at 324.
186 Id.  at 327 (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)).
187 Id.  at 329-30 (emphasis in original).
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case” of a total prohibition,188 not the everyday occurrence of a
partial use restriction.
On the question of whether Lucas  applies when “use” is taken,
or only when all “value” is taken, the Court followed the Ninth
Circuit. Lucas ’s per se rule, the Court implied, only applies to a
total elimination of “value.”  In reviewing Lucas ’s holding, the
Court carefully framed the Lucas  rule in terms of “value.”189
The Court pointed to the particular facts of the Lucas  case,
which involved a regulation that “wholly eliminated the value” of
Mr. Lucas’s land.190  It also pointed to language in a Lucas  foot-
note that uses the term “value” to explain that Lucas  applies
only to a one-hundred percent, but not to a ninety-five percent
deprivation.191  While they did not confront the issue head-on,
the Court quietly asserted that “value” is the relevant variable.
Turning to First English , the Court distinguished it as a case
about remedies, not temporary takings.192  Whether a taking had
occurred in that case was explicitly left to the lower court on re-
mand.193  Interestingly, the Court was silent on the distinction
between retrospectively temporary and prospectively temporary
land use restrictions.  The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on this dis-
tinction to find First English , a case about retrospectively tempo-
rary takings, inapplicable to prospectively temporary
moratoria.194  The Supreme Court instead asserted that,
whatever First English  did say about temporary takings, it did
not say a per se rule should apply.195  The First English  Court
suggested that the restriction might not be a taking if it was a
safety regulation; the Court also expressly distinguished “normal
delays” in permitting.196  For the TRPA  court, these exceptions
indicate an implicit rejection of a categorical rule for temporary
takings.197
188 Id.  at 332.
189 Id.  at 329-30.
190 Id.  at 330 (quoting Lucas , 505 at 1026).
191 Id.  (citing Lucas , 505 at 1019 n.8).
192 Id.  at 328-29.
193 Id.  at 329.
194 See TRPA , 216 F.3d 764, 778 (9th Cir. 2000).  A possible explanation for the
Supreme Court’s reluctance to rely on the prospective/retrospective distinction is
the fact that the land-use restriction in First English  was an “interim” measure, ar-
guably intended as prospectively temporary. See  482 U.S. at 307.
195 TRPA , 535 U.S. at 329.
196 Id.
197 Id.
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In its broader analysis, the Court considered whether a per se
rule for temporary takings is necessary for “fairness and justice,”
regardless of the fact that Lucas and First English  do not de-
mand such a rule.198  Applying what they call the “Armstrong
principle,”199 (apparently based on the Court’s determination in
Armstrong v. United States  that the Fifth Amendment was “de-
signed to bar Government from forcing some people to bear bur-
dens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole”),200 the Court found a new per se rule inap-
propriate.201  The Court began by offering seven possible rules
they could craft to dispose of the case.202  Four were immediately
rejected as unavailable due to the limited issue before the
Court.203  The three remaining options were:  (1) create a new
per se rule for temporary deprivations of all economically viable
use; (2) create a narrower version of the first that would exempt
“normal delays” in permitting; or (3) create a new rule which
requires compensation for moratoria that last beyond a certain
specified time.204
The Court found the first rule far too broad to achieve “fair-
ness and justice.”205  As they have presented the options, this
rule would make “normal delays” in permitting compensable on
a per se basis.  Taking this even further, the Court found that
compensation would also be required for “orders temporarily
prohibiting access to crime scenes, businesses that violate health
codes, fire-damaged buildings, or other areas that we cannot now
foresee.”206  A rule of such breadth, according to the Court,
would mean “government hardly could go on.”207
The Court found a second rule, which exempts “normal de-
lays,” impracticable.208  This rule would still encompass morato-
ria, “an essential tool of successful development.”209  Without
balancing the other interests, all moratoria would be compensa-
198 Id.  at 333.
199 Id.  at 321.
200 Id.  at 336 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
201 Id.  at 332.
202 Id.  at 333-34.
203 Id.  at 334.
204 Id.  at 333.
205 Id.  at 334-35.
206 Id.
207 Id.  (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
208 Id.  at 337-38.
209 Id.
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ble no matter how strong the good faith of planners, the expecta-
tions of owners, or the length of the restriction.210  The Court
also found untenable any distinction between moratoria and
“normal delays.”  The two are not easily distinguished, and plan-
ners would be tempted to turn compensable moratoria into not-
necessarily-compensable delays to avoid high costs.211
Finally, the third option, creating a permissible period for mor-
atoria, was rejected as beyond the Court’s competence.  While
the Court recognized that perhaps moratoria “that last for more
than one year should be viewed with special skepticism,” it noted
that certain circumstances can excuse even lengthy moratoria.212
The TRPA  trial court specifically found a thirty-two-month mor-
atorium reasonable under the circumstances of this case.213  The
Court found that time limits on moratoria are best left to state
legislatures.214
Throughout its discussion of these possible rules, the Court
contrasted the effects of per se and balancing rules.  Recalling its
revived respect for balancing in Palazzolo , the Court pointed to
the advantages of the Penn Central  approach.215  A per se rule
for temporary restrictions would create unfairness by compensat-
ing owners who lose all use for five days, but denying compensa-
tion to owners who permanently lose only ninety-five percent of
the use of their land.216  In contrast, a Penn Central  approach
would take into account the length of the moratorium in deter-
mining whether compensation is due.217  A balancing rule would
also take into consideration the strong “interest in facilitating in-
formed decisionmaking by regulatory agencies.”218  Such consid-
eration recognizes the value of moratoria to planning efforts and
requires compensation only where planning delays go too far.  Fi-
nally, the Court found balancing more appropriate where strong
reciprocities of advantage exist.  For some owners, they noted,
moratoria actually raises property values; those owners should
not automatically receive compensation under a per se rule
210 Id.  at 338.
211 Id.  at 337 n.31.
212 Id.  at 341-42.
213 Id.
214 Id.  at 342 & n.37.
215 Id.  at 335-36.
216 Id.  at 335 n.30.
217 See id.  at 338 n.34.
218 Id.  at 339.
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based on the assumption that they have been forced “to bear a
special burden.”219
The Supreme Court’s TRPA  decision tracks and reinforces
evolving fault-lines in takings jurisprudence between physical
and regulatory restrictions and total and partial restrictions.  Dis-
tinctions between physical invasions and regulatory restrictions
are traced back to the text of the Fifth Amendment itself, and
justified by the difference in severity of the government intru-
sion.  Distinctions between total and partial regulatory restric-
tions are supported by concerns of fairness (including
“reciprocity of advantage” considerations) and functional con-
cerns about government’s ability to “go on.” TRPA ’s strong re-
jection of conceptual severance, at least in the temporal
dimension, puts the brakes on expansion of Lucas ’s per se rule.
Along with Palazzolo , the Court’s TRPA  decision demonstrates
a new appreciation for the flexibility and fairness of Penn Cen-
tral ’s balancing test.
CONCLUSION
While no one would argue that the lines between physical and
regulatory takings and partial and total takings are the product of
a unified, deliberate process, they are also certainly not arbitrary.
As the Supreme Court affirmed in TRPA , the lines reflect impor-
tant differences in the severity of the invasion and the impact on
the landowner.  Furthermore, in an area where lines must surely
be drawn “if government is to go on,” the Court offers rational
and fair places to draw those lines.  It should always be
remembered that, while plaintiffs who can use a per se rule are
automatic winners, plaintiffs left with a balancing rule are not
automatic losers.  While landowners surely would prefer to use
the per se test, they can and do prove takings under the Penn
Central  test for a broad range of regulatory actions.  In the case
of moratoria, the per se test removes important considerations
from the analysis and fails to make critical distinctions between
regulatory actions with significantly different impacts on
landowners.
219 Id.  at 340-41.
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